Nietzsche's early political thinking II: "The Greek State" by Wilson, Timothy H.
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (2013): 171-216 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
Timothy H. Wilson 
 
 
Nietzsche’s Early Political Thinking II: “The Greek State” 
 
Timothy H. Wilson 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper uses an extended discussion of Nietzsche’s essay “The Greek State” to uncover the political 
aspects of his early thinking. The paper builds on a similar discussion of another essay from the same 
period, “Homer on Competition,” in arguing that Nietzsche’s thinking is based on a confrontation with 
the work of Plato. It is argued that the key to understanding “The Greek State” is seeing it, in its 
entirety, as an enigmatic interpretation and re-writing of Plato’s Republic. Nietzsche interprets the 
Republic as Plato’s accomplishment of the task of the genuine philosopher: the legislation of values 
and the moulding of human character.  
 
 
 
As a birthday gift to Cosima Wagner in December 1872, Nietzsche sent a carefully 
crafted, leather-bound manuscript in his best handwriting; the manuscript was entitled 
Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books. Although this work has not received wide 
attention within Nietzsche scholarship, two of the essays in that volume, “Homer on 
Competition” and “The Greek State,” give us an insightful summary of Nietzsche’s 
early political thinking. “Homer on Competition” presents Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the nature of existence as strife, while “The Greek State” presents Nietzsche’s 
understanding of how this natural strife unfolds itself in human institutions and 
regimes. The essays, then, provide the early Nietzsche’s most thoughtful articulation 
of the relation between nature and culture or convention – phusis and nomos – the 
distinction which lies at the very roots of Western political philosophy. 
 
For Nietzsche, state institutions and regimes (the domain of nomos) are essentially 
tied to a purposive nature (phusis) in its unfolding. The goal of this purposive 
unfolding is the creative individual (the genius). In this way, we can understand 
Nietzsche’s early political thinking by means of two sets of fundamental relations:  
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (2013): 171-216 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
172 
Timothy H. Wilson 
 
 
1. NATURE and the STATE 
 
2. The STATE and the INDIVIDUAL 
 
In another essay, I have undertaken the first part of an interpretation of the early 
Nietzsche in terms of these two sets of relations. That essay, by means of a close 
reading of “Homer on Competition,” explores Nietzsche’s understanding of nature as 
strife, and how it channels itself into cultural or state forms. The present essay 
contains part two of this analysis. By means of a close reading of “The Greek State,” 
it explores how the state, rooted in nature, leads to the production of the genius or 
individual.
1
 
 
I) On Nietzsche’s Early Political Thinking 
 
i) The State or the Individual  
The present inquiry builds on its predecessor in a few respects. First of all, it takes as 
its point of departure the assumption that Nietzsche, indeed, had a political teaching. 
This assumption would seem to be contradicted, in the first instance, by Nietzsche’s 
own insistence that he was, in fact, the “last anti-political German.”2 Rather than a 
political teaching, Nietzsche seems to offer us a vision of the unfettered creativity of 
the individual – a creativity that any communal effort can only mask or hinder. If we 
can say anything, at best we can say that his political thinking is in the negative mode; 
that is, Nietzsche’s political teachings seem to consist of attacks against certain 
enemies. Indeed, he characterized himself as “warlike by nature.” This self-
characterization repeats a dominant theme within his writings: the equation of identity 
and opposition. A thing becomes what it is through the enemy, through the limitation, 
or through the dialogic conflict with that which differs (EH 1.7). Yet, Nietzsche’s 
negative or warlike stance does not preclude the production of a “positive” political 
teaching: “I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the 
opposite of a No-saying spirit. I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me” 
(EH 4.1). 
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The modern “State” is one of the enemies that the warlike Nietzsche attacks most 
vehemently. For him, it is the “coldest of all cold monsters” (TZ 1.11); it is the false 
idol that prevents the growth of the creative individual. According to Nietzsche’s 
logic of affirmation by means of opposition, however, this warlike attack on the 
modern State should yield fruit in the form of a positive political teaching. By turning 
to Nietzsche’s early thinking, I will attempt to harvest this positive political fruit. In 
“The Greek State,” the early Nietzsche describes the form of political community that 
presents a positive possibility for political action.  
 
The present inquiry, like that of “Homer on Competition,” reveals that Nietzsche’s 
teaching does not fit within either of the polar categories usually carved out for it by 
Nietzsche scholars. The early twentieth-century reception of Nietzsche saw in his 
writings a prophecy of the race-based and nation-based politics of that era (see 
Golomb and Wistrich). Nietzsche was seen as the consummate philosopher of the 
“State” or the political community, as rooted in a national or racial identity. In 
response to this tendency, the pendulum of Nietzsche scholarship has swung in the 
other direction. Beginning with Walter Kaufmann’s landmark study, scholars have 
emphasized the individualism and apolitical nature of Nietzsche’s thinking. Rather 
than a philosopher prophesying the rule of any group, Nietzsche is celebrated as a 
prophet of individual self-realization and rebellion against any existing social norms 
or standards.
3
 In “The Greek State” Nietzsche elucidates his understanding of the 
relations between the state and the individual. This set of relations charts a course 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of these two poles of Nietzsche interpretation. As 
was discovered through the analysis of “Homer on Competition”, two dimensions of 
Nietzsche’s thinking are discernible: (1) a political dimension wherein the sources and 
benefits of contest and cohesion within a group are identified, and (2) a transpolitical 
dimension wherein the sources and benefits of contest and cohesion within a “republic 
of geniuses” who call to one another across the ages are identified. The two 
dimensions are co-defining in that the political dimension, as embodied in the State, 
has as its goal the production of the individual genius, while the transpolitical 
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dimension, as embodied in the individual genius, acts in such a way as to give an end 
or meaning to the State. 
 
ii) The Art of Lento 
The present inquiry also builds on its predecessor in terms of its method. The analysis 
of “Homer on Competition” revealed that the art of slow reading was required in 
order to cull the essay’s deepest secrets. Nietzsche, as well as his works, “are friends 
of lento.” It is for this reason that Nietzsche as a philosopher is inseparable from 
Nietzsche as a philologist, “that is to say, a teacher of slow reading.” This art of slow 
reading is difficult to teach, says Nietzsche, “in the midst of an age of ‘work’, … of 
hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste” (D, “Preface” 5). According to Cosima 
Wagner, Nietzsche’s manuscript showed “signs of clumsy abruptness” (163). Cosima 
received the Five Prefaces during what she refers to as a “gloomy phase” in the life of 
the Wagners. Perhaps this gloomy disposition did not allow her to practice the type of 
slow reading that the essays require. Despite appearing to be clumsy and abrupt, the 
Five Prefaces are, in fact, carefully crafted. Through the analysis of “Homer on 
Competition”, we discovered that the structure of Nietzsche’s work, as well as his 
carefully chosen selection of examples and citations, reveal deeper meanings beneath 
the manifest shell of the text. We will need to be mindful of similar clues and 
underlying structures as we survey the terrain of “The Greek State.” By closely 
analyzing the works in this way, we can see that Nietzsche’s early thinking contains 
many of the essential insights of the supposedly “mature” works. Despite the changes 
in style and intellectual position with respect to certain questions, there is a 
fundamental continuity throughout Nietzsche’s intellectual career when it comes to 
many of his core concepts. This also means that study of his “early” thinking can 
provide essential insights into certain dimensions of Nietzsche’s later works.4 
 
iii) Nietzsche’s Contest with Plato 
Finally, the present inquiry, like its predecessor, sees Nietzsche’s engagement with 
the thought of Plato as central to understanding his political teaching.
5
 We saw that in 
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“Homer on Competition” the ultimate competition was not Homer’s own contest with 
Hesiod, but that of Plato against Homer. “Homer’s Wettkampf” is really about 
“Plato’s Wettkampf”. So too, “The Greek State” could more aptly be named “The 
Platonic State.” In “The Greek State,” modern political institutions and principles of 
equality are opposed to “Plato’s perfect state.” Nietzsche reaches this affirmation of 
Plato’s state in the last paragraph of the essay, where he indicates that he finds “in the 
total concept of the Platonic state, the wonderfully grand hieroglyph of a profound 
esoteric doctrine of the connection between state and genius, eternally needing to be 
interpreted.”6 He also indicates that the entire essay has been his attempt to express 
what he has “fathomed of this secret script.”  
 
Nietzsche’s entire essay, then, is an extended reading of Plato’s Republic, an 
interpretation which attempts to reveal its secrets and uncover its mysteries. This is a 
baffling claim. The essay, at first sight at least, bears no signs of being an extended 
discussion of Plato’s book. It discusses, instead, various manifestations of Greek 
political experience, without explicitly referring to Plato, and contrasts them with the 
faults of the political opinions of Nietzsche’s day. Nietzsche’s essay seems, on the 
surface at least, concerned only with the need for a new, pyramidal, caste-like society 
– with a broad base of slaves to support a few cultural creators. In this way, 
Nietzsche’s early essay is consistent with his discussion of the law of Manu in The 
Antichrist, a work composed in his last productive year (1888): “A high culture is a 
pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base; its first presupposition is a strong and 
soundly consolidated mediocrity” (A 57). In order to provide for this sound 
consolidation of mediocrity, “The Greek State” asserts the need to unleash the warrior 
instincts of society. Such instincts forge a hierarchical society, wherein a military 
caste, headed by the “military genius”, sits atop the pyramid ruling a broad base of 
slave-labourers. At best we could say that this discussion of a caste-like society bears 
superficial resemblance to Plato’s Republic inasmuch as the “city in speech” 
described in Books 2 - 4 contains a similar ordering of rulers, warriors and labourers. 
Nowhere do we see, however, any overt reference to the dialogue’s central discussion 
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of the philosopher and his fitness for ruling in the highest sense, expressed ultimately 
in those most powerful of poetic images that form the centre of Plato’s work: the 
images of the Sun, the Divided Line and the Cave. Nietzsche’s essay does not even 
mention the title of Plato’s dialogue. On the face of it, the Republic is virtually absent 
from the discussion until the end of the essay; yet Nietzsche claims that the whole 
essay is an extended unlocking of its innermost secrets. Let us take him at his word on 
this and see if we can hunt down any traces of its presence. Let us begin by exploring 
that against which he defined the ideal of the Platonic state: the modern state. 
 
II) The Crisis of Modernity 
 
Nietzsche reaches this affirmation of the Platonic state as an ideal only at the end of 
the essay. The body of the essay proper consists of a prolonged critique of certain 
aspects of modern politics, and this critique of modern politics is tied to a more 
fundamental critique of modernity itself. For Nietzsche, modernity presents itself as a 
crisis: the highest values that have guided the actions of Western humanity for the last 
two millennia have devalued themselves. Unable to posit new ends or values, modern 
humanity exists in the desert of nihilism. “What does nihilism mean? That the highest 
values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer” (WTP 2; cf. 
also WTP 12, 18). Without new ends or values, humanity clings to modern state forms 
and mere existence itself as a way to find meaning (see EH 3 “The Case of Wagner” 
2).  
 
This is the significance of Nietzsche’s opening remarks in the essay. Nietzsche begins 
by ironically confronting the “advantage” of us moderns in relation to the Greeks: 
“We moderns have the advantage over the Greeks with two concepts given as 
consolation, as it were, to a world which behaves in a thoroughly slave-like manner 
whilst anxiously avoiding the word ‘slave’: we speak of the ‘dignity of man’ [Würde 
des Menschen] and of the ‘dignity of work’ [Würde der Arbeit] (Paragraph 1). 
“Würde” signifies dignity, that which is worthy of respect. It also signifies honour, in 
the sense that what is dignified possesses an honour and order of rank higher than 
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what is ordinary. According to modern thinking, all humanity and all labouring 
activity, no matter how aimless, shares the same dignity and honour.  
 
i) The Ends of Man 
This state of affairs contrasts sharply with that of ancient Greece. For the Greeks, 
dignity was accorded to those rare men and those rare actions that embodied and 
enacted the virtues of the city to the highest degree. More generally, the dignity of any 
thing as such can be seen only in the fulfillment of its excellence or virtue (arête). The 
eye, for instance, deserves the dignity of that name only inasmuch as it can see. Sight 
is the excellence, virtue or proper functioning of the eye (cf. Xenophon, Symposium 
5.2-5; Memoirs III.8). In other words, sight is the “end” or “final cause” for which the 
activities of the eye take place. For this reason, classical philosophy concerned itself 
with attaining wisdom with respect to the end or “good” of each thing. Aristotle 
makes this clear in his definition of philosophy as the quest for wisdom, wherein 
“‘wisdom’ is concerned with the first causes and principles” (Metaphysics 981b). 
There are four types of cause or principle to be examined by the philosopher: material, 
formal, efficient and final. In its highest sense, however, philosophy is a way of 
thinking which attempts to articulate the final cause: the “why” of each thing, the 
“good” of each thing. The supreme way of knowing, the highest philosophy, “is the 
one which knows that for the sake of which each thing must be done, and this is the 
good in each case, and, in general, the highest good in the whole of nature” 
(Metaphysics 982b). Classical political philosophy, as a branch of philosophy, seeks 
wisdom concerning political things and it defines this wisdom as an articulation of the 
“ends” of the political things or their “ought to be.” Classical political philosophy, 
then, took as its point of departure considerations of the best political order and 
considerations of the best way to live.  
 
The crisis of modernity begins with the modern philosophical revolution – whose 
point of departure was a certain narrowing of the classical philosophical horizon 
described above. Modern thought has its foundation in three breaks from the classical 
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definition of philosophy: the refusal to account for the goal of society, or how things 
“ought” to be, as first articulated in the political philosophy of Machiavelli; the refusal 
to account for the “final cause” of beings, as first asserted in the natural philosophy of 
Bacon; and the positioning of the human subject as the pivotal locus of truth, as first 
developed in the metaphysics of Descartes. 
 
ii) Machiavelli 
For Machiavelli, the attempt to account for and secure the final ends of humanity 
within the political community had been misguided and unrealistic. The notion that 
man has an excellence or virtue (arête) that is proper to him must be abandoned in 
order to accommodate the accomplishment of more modest goals (The Prince, chapter 
15). In this way, Machiavelli consciously lowers the standards of social action. He 
lowers the standards such that the actualization of those standards is more possible, 
more in accordance with that aspect of fortune that can be shaped by human willing 
(cf. Strauss 1983, 213).  
 
 
I compare fortune to one of those dangerous rivers that, when 
they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees and 
buildings, move earth from one place and deposit it in another. 
… But this does not mean that, when the river is not in flood, 
men are unable to take precautions, by means of dykes and dams, 
so that when it rises next time, it will either not overflow its 
banks or, if it does, its force will not be so uncontrolled or 
damaging (chapter 25). 
 
 
Fortuna can be shaped, within limits, by a certain virtú. Of course, this is a different 
sense of virtue than that described by the classical political philosophers. Virtue is no 
longer considered one’s proper end (telos) that has been allotted by fate or that is 
fixed in accordance with one’s nature. Rather, virtue is now considered the active 
power of self-determination. For this re-thinking of virtue to become possible, and 
through it the Machiavellian lowering of the horizon for social action, man in his 
essence had to be seen as Protean. This decisive modern insight was, of course, 
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articulated by Pico della Mirandola. In his Oration on the Dignity of Man, he has God 
say the following words to Adam: “We have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, 
neither mortal nor immortal, so that, more freely and more honourably the moulder 
and maker of yourself, you may fashion yourself in whatever form you shall prefer” 
(478).
7
 For Machiavelli, too, man’s ends, or the virtue and dignity proper to man, 
were malleable; they can be moulded by the proper institutions – as long as we do not 
set our sights too high.  
 
iii) Bacon 
This occurrence in the realm of political thinking found its corollary in natural 
philosophy. There, too, beginning with the thought of Bacon, the search for the ends 
or final causes of things had to be discarded in order to achieve a foundational 
knowledge that would benefit man here and now (New Organon 1.65). It is for this 
reason that Bacon sees Machiavelli as a father of the inductive method in the realm of 
civil philosophy. That is, Machiavelli uses histories and examples, not general 
unfounded axioms. “We are much beholden to Machiavel and others that write what 
men do, and not what they ought to do” (III.430).  
 
The classical attempt to understand the “why” or the ultimate purpose behind the 
phenomena was an abstraction from nature as it is in itself. Bacon claims that his 
method of eliminative induction is a way of encountering nature as it shows itself; it is 
a true “interpretation” of nature, unclouded by prior theoretical prejudices, as opposed 
to what he calls “Anticipations of Nature” (New Organon 1.25). In order to interpret 
nature as it shows itself, we must “be content to wait upon nature instead of vainly 
affecting to overrule her” (Great Instauration 298-99). Although the ostensible 
modality of this interpretation is one of servitude to nature, the ultimate goal of this 
scientific interpretation of nature is a certain, secured power over and commanding of 
nature: “For the end which this science of mine proposes is the invention not of 
arguments but of arts, not of things in accordance with principles but of principles 
themselves, not of probable reasons but of designations and directions for works. And 
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as the intention is different, so accordingly is the effect, the effect of the one being to 
overcome an opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action” (Great 
Instauration 314). Bacon sums up this paradoxical relation between his method and 
the purposes of human mastery to which it is directed: “Nature to be commanded 
must be obeyed” (New Organon 1.3). One cannot simply observe nature empirically, 
however, in order to know and control her. Nature is much too self-concealing and 
subtle (New Organon 1.10). The ability to command nature will only arise through the 
methodological approach to studying nature: “Our steps must be guided by a clue, and 
the whole way from the very first perception of the senses must be laid out upon a 
sure plan” (Great Instauration 307). Gradually, through the rigour of research, we 
will build our knowledge from the particular to the more general and all-embracing 
truth; eventually we will be able to know the forms or necessary conditions of all 
things (New Organon 2.4-5). By means of a rigorous research plan that follows a 
careful framework, Bacon proposes “to establish progressive stages of certainty” 
(New Organon, “Preface” 327). 
 
Thus, in Bacon’s natural philosophy, as in Machiavelli’s political philosophy, the 
source of the order or virtue of the things themselves was seen to be replaced by the 
operation of a certain human action. Things do not have a proper nature within 
themselves; rather, their identity and meaning arise only within the realm of 
knowledge as moulded by a human, experimental ground plan. The projected “third 
part” of Bacon’s Great Instauration was to embrace “the Phenomena of the Universe; 
that is to say, experience of every kind, and such a natural history as may serve for a 
foundation to build philosophy upon” (318). This embracing of phenomena, this 
natural history as the foundation of a new philosophy, was “to be a history not only of 
nature free and at large (when she is left to her own course and does her work her own 
way) ... but much more of nature under constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by 
art and the hand of man she is forced out of her natural state, and squeezed and 
moulded. ... Nay (to say the plain truth) I do in fact (low and vulgar as men may think 
it) count more upon this part both for helps and safeguards than upon the other, seeing 
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that the nature of things betrays itself more readily under the vexations of art than in 
its natural freedom” (320). Nature is experienced here as that which can be forced, 
through a certain human moulding and measuring, to betray itself, or show itself in a 
way that is not “natural,” that is outside of its own limit and measure. Within 
Baconian science, beings are “drag[ged] into light” (320) and are not granted the 
withdrawal and limits which make them what they are.
8
 
 
iv) Descartes 
The modern revolution in philosophy, then, is marked by the refusal to consider the 
final cause of things; rather than having ends within themselves, things arise only as 
moulded by a certain human activity or ground plan. It was Machiavelli who first took 
this approach with respect to the political things and it was Bacon who first took this 
approach with respect to the things of nature. With the thinking of Descartes we see 
the first articulation of the broader metaphyscial point of departure that this modern 
revolution in thinking assumes. For Descartes, it is not a particular realm of things 
that arises as defined by its relation to a human moulding; rather, existence itself, truth 
itself, is defined by means of a determinative relation to the human subject. 
 
Descartes begins his Meditations by applying himself “to the general destruction of all 
[his] former opinions” (95). The “First Meditation,” then, concerns itself with the 
destruction of the foundation of all knowledge. Because he is destroying the 
foundation of knowledge, truth, and Being, he does not have to concern himself with 
individual propositions that would be derived from that foundation: “the destruction 
of the foundation necessarily brings down with it the rest of the edifice” (Descartes 
95). This foundation will have to, in turn, be reconstructed on a new ground. 
Descartes finds a new Archimedean point for the truth of beings in the “Second 
Meditation”: “Archimedes, in order to take the terrestrial globe from its place and 
move it to another, asked only for a point which was fixed and assured. So also, I 
shall have the right to entertain high hopes, if I am fortunate enough to find only one 
thing which is certain and indubitable” (102). This Archimedean point of security and 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (2013): 171-216 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
182 
Timothy H. Wilson 
 
 
certainty, and with it the founding of modern metaphysics, stands in Descartes’ 
statement: Ego cogito, ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am.” Here, the locus of truth is 
shifted to the subject in its certain representing. “All consciousness of things and of 
beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as 
the unshakable ground of all certainty” (Heidegger 1982, 86; cf. also 1977a, 127-28). 
The essence of truth becomes this self-asserted certainty. For the Greeks, human 
existence consists of a certain receptivity to that which presences in unconcealment 
(alētheia). The medieval metaphysics founded by the Latin translation of alētheia into 
verum-falsum, and prepared for by the Platonic-Aristotelian assertion of truth as 
homoiosis, still echoes this receptivity inasmuch as the true and the fallen are taken to 
be that which are given by God; they are not products of human representing. The 
salvation to be secured in medieval metaphysics, for instance, is grounded in 
revelation as interpreted and consolidated in Christian doctrine.
9
 In modern 
metaphysics, however, the modern subject becomes the self-secured locus of certainty 
as well as the measure and setting of beings (Heidegger 1977a, 131-32).
10
  
 
v) The Value of Existence: Hobbes, Locke, Hegel 
Given that, within this modern revolution of thinking, the thing itself in its nature can 
no longer be defined in terms of its own end or virtue, it comes to be defined as the 
means to any end that may be posited by the human subject – modern rationalism 
replaces classical rationalism by being “instrumental”. The state does not exist, for 
instance, to foster one’s virtue; it exists to provide the means to the individual pursuit 
of one’s own ends. Since various, individually chosen, ends cannot be unqualifiedly 
affirmed by the community, the means (wealth, fame etc.) become the virtues of the 
modern community. These were the ultimate conclusions, building on the insights of 
Machiavelli, Bacon, and Descartes, reached by Hobbes and Locke, and which form 
the basic principles of modern liberalism. This is why Nietzsche refers to the modern 
concept of the “dignity of work” with such disdain. Greek crafts or skilled labour 
(technē) are justified in their ends, or their products. In the modern experience, in the 
absence of an agreed upon purpose to all of our mindless activity and busy-work, the 
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activity itself comes to be celebrated. With his discovery of the value of work itself, 
outside of a purpose, modern man lies to himself and says that he has invented 
happiness; however, this fiction is too transparent to nourish his self-overcoming. 
 
The problems identified here with the “dignity of work” also point to the reasons for 
Nietzsche’s questioning of the “dignity of man,” or of the value of his existence. The 
modern age “is infected with the biographical plague,” which forces it to “quite 
different and statelier thoughts as to the dignity of man” than would otherwise be 
warranted (PTG 4). In the context of this faith in the value of human existence and the 
dignity of man, the plague of modernity reaches its fevered pitch in the absolute 
denial of the possibility of transcending our individual passions – including the base 
desire for mere existence, rather than self-transcendence. The point of departure of 
Hobbes, for instance, can be contrasted with that of the classical political 
philosophers. While the latter had based their normative judgements on reflections on 
the “ends” of man, Hobbes makes man’s beginnings his basis (Strauss 1953, 180). 
Hobbes’ point of departure is that the political community arises out of a primordial 
state of nature ruled by a bellum omnium contra omnes. The state arises by means of a 
social contract designed as a way of ensuring that all of the combatants in this struggle 
have their most basic desire fulfilled: the desire to exist; or, more pointedly, the state 
has its origin in the basest of passions: the fear of violent death (Leviathan chap. 13, 
14, 27).  
 
Locke agrees with Hobbes in every fundamental respect, but takes his conclusions 
further. For Locke, as for Hobbes, one gives up the theoretical freedoms enjoyed in 
the state of nature in order to make his self preservation more secure (Second Treatise, 
sect. 123). However, Locke extends the pre-requisites of self-preservation: not just 
security against external, physical threats is needed, one also needs nourishment, or 
more generally, property. Locke introduces the value of acquisitiveness to the basic 
desire for self-preservation. Acquisitiveness does not lead to happiness, however. The 
painful labour to acquire possessions is a manifestation of man’s negative freedom, 
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man’s reaction to his basic and unending misery. Self-preservation as acquisitiveness 
marks modern man’s existence as a “joyless quest for joy” (Strauss 1953, 251). 
 
The logic of modernity, and with it the apotheosis of the value of self-preservation, is 
extended in Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave, where the slave becomes a slave as 
such by ending the battle to the death for recognition and submitting to the eventual 
master – that is, by valuing mere existence over mastery and other forms of honour 
(cf. Phenomenology, Sect. 178-96; Kojève 3-30). It is for this reason that Nietzsche 
refers to modernity as a “slave-like” culture or morality: a culture based on the “the 
drive to exist at any price, the same all-powerful drive which makes stunted plants 
push their roots into arid rocks” (“GSt”, Paragraph 1). Within the aristocratic culture 
or master morality of the Greeks, on the contrary, “[w]ork is a disgrace because 
existence has no inherent value” (Paragraph 3). 
 
In “The Greek State,” Nietzsche attempts to uncover the illusions of the modern 
thinkers mentioned above concerning the “origin and meaning of the state” 
(Paragraph 7). Rather than existing to preserve the individual’s mere existence, the 
state has as its goal the production of genius. Nietzsche seems to agree with the 
Hobbesian characterization of the state of nature as a bellum omnium contra omnes, 
which he quotes twice (Paragraph 11; see also WTP 99-100). He agrees with the 
premise that existence at its core is strife. The highest goddess, although one with a 
Janus-face, is Eris (“HC”, Paragraphs 5, 6). However, he disagrees with the theory 
that states are formed by means of a contract to preserve existence per se. Rather, 
nature’s purpose in first crafting “the cruel tool of the state” is to provide “the point 
where the individual completely transcends himself and no longer has to procreate 
and work in the service of the continuation of his individual life (“GSt”, Paragraph 8, 
3).  
 
It is within the context of the modern replacement of ends with means as the 
ultimately defining character of one’s life, as well as modernity’s slave-like valuing of 
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mere existence, that Nietzsche opens his preface. Within the horizon of modernity, 
men and their actions can no longer arise within their proper dignity in the sense of 
ends; rather, men and their actions arise as interchangeably equal – as equally 
valuable and, thus, equally valueless. Nietzsche would later characterize the product 
of this enlightened, liberal rationality as the “last man”. The last man is the 
culmination of the logic of modernity described here, seeking a peaceful, conflict-free 
existence of simple pleasures and convenience: “One still quarrels, but one is soon 
reconciled – else it might spoil the digestion” (TZ 1 “Prologue” 5). In order to be able 
to live in the face of the meaninglessness of his existence, modern man, as the “last 
man”, must create fictions for himself, fictions that can be seen in such modern 
notions as “the alleged ‘equal rights for all’ or the ‘fundamental rights of man’, of 
man as such, or in the dignity of work.” We should note that Nietzsche does not 
oppose these fictions because they are fictions; rather, he opposes them because they 
are “transparent lies” (“GSt”, Paragraph 3). 
 
vi) Modernity’s Transparent Lies 
The lies spun out of the depths of the crisis of modernity are “transparent,” according 
to Nietzsche. Of course, Plato’s “perfect state” would rely on the use of a “noble” 
(gennaion) lie. “Could we,” Socrates asks Glaucon, “somehow contrive one of those 
lies that come into being in case of need, of which we were just speaking, some one 
noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the 
city?” (Republic 414b). The difference between Plato’s noble lie and the slave-like 
lies of modernity seems to rest, for Nietzsche, on their respective powers to persuade. 
On the one hand, Plato’s lie will persuade the entire community, perhaps even the 
rulers. On the other hand, the lies by which the modern slave lives are “transparent”. 
The power to persuade is a function of the poetic and rhetorical arts. Socrates does not 
possess these arts. After the description of the noble lie that the citizens would be 
called upon to believe in order to ensure the unity of the “city in speech”, Glaucon 
asks Socrates if he has “some device for persuading them of this tale?” “None at all,” 
Socrates responds, “for these men themselves; however for their sons and their 
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successors and the rest of the human beings who come afterwards” (415c-d). Socrates 
lacks the poetic and rhetorical arts; thus, he will rely on the authority of tradition to 
inculcate this new code. Let us leave aside for now the question of whether or not, 
lacking the ability to persuade the present generation, Socrates by himself would be 
any more successful at persuading future generations. Rather, let us take note of 
where, within the parameters of the Republic, the power to persuade does reside. In 
the Republic, the poetic and rhetorical arts are embodied in the figure of 
Thrasymachus. He is the only participant in the dialogue who professes to possess an 
art or skill. In order for the Socratic revolution in thinking to gain sway, it would need 
to be married with Thrasymachus’ rhetorical skill. This is the significance of the fact 
that Socrates and Thrasymachus are shown to be ultimately friends – despite their 
ostensible opposition in Book 1 (498c-d). Perhaps this is because Thrasymachus now 
believes that Socrates is no longer a threat to the city; perhaps it is because he now 
sees that his rhetoric has a place in Socrates’ enterprise for which philosophy alone 
does not suffice (Bloom 400; see also Palmer 14; and Strauss 1964, 123-4). 
 
For Nietzsche, a healthy society is founded on its artistic vision. “Plato’s perfect 
state,” through the poetics of its noble lie, would be an example of this type of 
artistically founded community. Nietzsche saw in the Greeks of the tragic age the 
highest example of such an artistically founded community. As Nietzsche asserts in 
his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, the Greeks of the tragic age enjoyed such cultural 
health because they were able to balance their two fundamental artistic impulses (the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian). The Apollonian fiction is necessary, says Nietzsche, 
in order to veil the Dionysian horror of becoming. Nietzsche describes that Dionysian 
becoming as a contradictory melange of all things, as an absence of distinctions, 
orders of rank or meaning:  
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Whatever wants to live, or rather must live, in this horrifying 
constellation of things is quintessentially a reflection of the 
primeval pain and contradiction and must seem … an insatiable 
craving for existence and eternal self-contradiction in terms of 
time, therefore as becoming. Every moment devours the 
preceding one, every birth is the death of countless beings, 
procreating, living and murdering are all one (“GSt”, Paragraph 
6).  
 
 
The role of the artistic fiction is to draw distinctions, and posit orders of rank and 
value on this otherwise contradictory maelstrom of becoming: “To impose upon 
becoming the character of being – that is the supreme will to power” (WTP 617). The 
myths conveyed by the earliest poets performed such a function. The first Greek 
philosophers, however, turned from these myths and poetic fictions to see if they 
could discern the meaning of nature herself (Metaphysics 983b). Nietzsche observes 
that, over two millennia later, this inquiry into nature has yielded no fundamental 
insights into the meaning of its becoming. This holds true today despite the 
advancements in theoretical physics achieved after Nietzsche’s death. According to 
Richard Feynman, for instance, quantum mechanics “describes nature as absurd from 
the point of view of common sense. And it fully agrees with experiment. So I hope 
you can accept nature as She is – absurd” (129). In our age of the absurd, we moderns, 
indeed, accept that nature is meaningless – we stare into the void without the comfort 
of a sheltering lie or fiction. 
 
In contrast, the genius of the Greeks manifested itself in their Janus nature. The 
Greeks of the tragic age possessed a Dionysian element in their culture that allowed 
them to stare into the abyss and experience the absurdity of nature. The Greeks also 
possessed, however, an Apollonian element in their culture that allowed them to add a 
veil of appearance to this maelstrom of becoming. The first, pre-Socratic 
philosophers, although turning to nature in its becoming, shared this tragic vision 
inasmuch as they were still able to poetically gather the multiplicity of nature into a 
certain whole and to “legislate” for humanity by drawing the lines of distinction that 
would otherwise be lacking: “Now the concept of greatness is changeable. … And so 
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philosophy starts by legislating greatness. Part of this is a sort of name-giving. ‘This is 
a great thing,’ says philosophy, thereby elevating man over the blind unrestrained 
greed of his drive for knowledge” (PTG 3). The death of Greece’s tragic culture, for 
Nietzsche, arises out of Socratism – the optimism that sees in nature, including human 
nature, a rational order without need of poetic veil, an optimism that was to lead to the 
modern “delusion of limitless power” over nature by means of a certain knowledge of 
nature (BT 18).
11
 Socratism ultimately led to the crisis of modernity we have been 
discussing; the optimistic inquiry into the nature of all things is consummated in the 
experience of existence as meaningless, as without an end or purpose, other than 
where an end has been posited by human frameworks. For Nietzsche, modernity is 
within the grips of an enduring Socratism and, like Socrates himself, lacks the artistic 
ability to posit a new fiction or “noble lie”. 
 
It is for this reason that Nietzsche felt the issues of modern politics were tied to issues 
of modern art and culture. “The Greek State” originally constituted a section of an 
early draft of The Birth of Tragedy – entitled “The Origin and Aim of Tragedy” 
(KGW 3.5, 142-55). It was removed from the final version of Nietzsche’s book, 
perhaps at the request of Richard Wagner, but remnants of its arguments, concerning 
the need for a slave class, for instance, remain (BT 18; Ruehl 83). The crisis of 
modernity, as outlined in the first few paragraphs of “The Greek State,” is tied to a 
crisis of art; it is tied to the fact that the fictions by which we moderns live are 
“transparent”. Fictions such as the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of work” are 
self-contradictions and cannot create the sheltering horizon needed for human culture 
to flourish. 
 
III) Art and the Polis 
 
Nietzsche makes this point concerning the connections between politics and art 
explicit later in the essay: “It is through this mysterious [geheimnissvollen] connection 
which we sense here between the state and art, political greed and artistic creations, 
battlefield and work of art, that, as I said, we understand the state only as the iron 
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clamp producing society by force” (Paragraph 11). We have seen briefly how this 
connection is delineated through the opposition of Apollo and Dionysus according to 
the argument of The Birth of Tragedy; however, in what ways, exactly, within the 
rubric of “The Greek State” itself, is art tied to the “iron clamp” of the state?  
 
The answer to that question takes us to the heart of the essay and its central concerns. 
As Nietzsche makes clear in “The Greek State,” the realm of nature and its 
meaningless necessities is transcended by means of the state. The state forces the 
majority to slavishly satisfy the natural necessities of existence “beyond the measure 
that is necessary for the individual.” Through this toil and misery, a “small number of 
Olympian men” can be “removed from the struggle for existence, in order to produce 
and satisfy a new world of necessities.” This new world of necessities is a world of 
cultural or artistic necessities: “Culture … is first and foremost a real hunger for art” 
(Paragraphs 5 and 6). In this way, we can think of nature in its relation to art and 
culture as having “an uncanny dual character” (“HC”, Paragraph 1), with the state as 
the hinge linking the two extremes. On the one hand there is “the horrifying, 
predatory aspect of the Sphinx of nature”; on the other hand, through “the 
glorification of the artistically free life of culture,” the same Sphinx “so beautifully 
presents the torso of a young woman” (“GSt”, Paragraph 5). For this reason, 
Nietzsche asserts that the birth of culture and its creation of art and the world of 
appearance, by means of the genius, is the salvation and ultimate goal of nature: “then 
all this indicates how enormously necessary the state is, without which nature might 
not succeed in achieving, through society, her salvation in appearance, in the mirror of 
genius” (Paragraph 9). For Nietzsche, this “is the fundamental idea of culture … to 
prepare the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and 
without us and thereby work at the perfecting of nature” (emphasis in original) (UMc 
5, cf. 6). 
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i) The Question of the Value of Art 
So, when Nietzsche thinks about the connections between the state and art, he seems 
to be praising art in the highest terms; that is, art is tied to the state inasmuch as art is 
the goal or end of all political activity. Art is nature’s goal, for which she “forge[s] for 
herself the cruel tool of the state” (Paragraph 8). Nietzsche’s essay is not unreservedly 
praising of the artistic genius and his activity, however. Earlier in the essay, while 
critiquing the notion of the dignity of work, he refers to Plutarch in order to make the 
point that no noble Greek would ever wish to be an artist, despite enjoying the 
products of artistic labour: “Plutarch says somewhere, with ancient Greek instinct, 
that no youth of noble birth would want to be a Phidias himself when he saw the Zeus 
in Pisa or a Polyklet when he saw the Hera in Argos: and would have just as little 
desire to be Anacreaon, Philetas or Archilochus, however much he delighted in their 
poetry” (Paragraph 4). Nietzsche is pointing to a difference between artistic activity as 
such, which, for the Greeks, “falls into the same category of undignified work as any 
philistine craft,” and the work of art as final product. Artistic creation is a craft 
(technē) like all other crafts and finds its meaning in its telos only, not in its activity.  
 
This leads to certain questions regarding the notions of art and craft (technē) raised in 
Plato’s Republic. The “city in speech” discussed in Books 2 to 4 of the dialogue is 
based on the principle that each individual should practice one craft. The shoemaker 
should practice the art of making shoes, and no other; the warriors should practice the 
art of war and no other. Justice itself is defined in Book 4 in accordance with this 
overriding principle (432d-33a). This principle does not preclude a hierarchy of arts, 
however. The rulers are the ones with political wisdom; their art of ruling is higher 
than the others. The warriors’ art takes the second place in terms of importance. 
Finally, all other types of ordinary labourers or money-makers practice a third order 
of craft. Of course, the one form of technē that Plato seems to prohibit in this “city in 
speech” is the poetic or artistic technē. In the first instance, in the discussion of poetry 
in Books 2 and 3, Plato has Socrates say that poetry must be banished because the 
poet attempts to play different roles and practice different arts (397d-e). How, the 
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reader must ask himself at this point, did Nietzsche interpret this controversial 
element of Plato’s dialogue, and in what way can Plato’s critique of art shed light on 
the relations between art and the political realm? 
 
ii) Plutarch and the “Divine Plato”  
In order to address these questions, let us look more closely at the reference to 
Plutarch that first brings up the notion that artistic creation is as “undignified work as 
any philistine craft.” As indicated above, Nietzsche’s references and citations are 
carefully chosen and often reveal deeper meanings to those who practice the art of 
“slow reading”. Nietzsche introduces this particular reference with the words 
“Plutarch says somewhere,” indicating that he does not have the text at hand and does 
not even remember the context within which the point was made. Nietzsche then goes 
on, however, to recite Plutarch’s text practically verbatim – most tellingly, the list of 
five artists and their respective works of art are enumerated in the exact order of 
Plutarch’s text. Perhaps Nietzsche, indeed, did not have the text in front of him as he 
wrote this passage and was relying on his prodigious memory. What is more likely, 
however, is that he did have the text in front of him and was very conscious of the 
context of the quote. At this point, early in the essay, Nietzsche is testing the reader to 
see if he has the patience to read slowly. 
 
“Plutarch says somewhere”, we are told, but if we are to search within the hidden 
machinery of Nietzsche’s thinking and follow these casual references to their source, 
how are we to know exactly where Plutarch makes this point – aside from reading 
everything Plutarch ever wrote? Nietzsche gives us a clue earlier in the essay. The 
previous citation in the essay was to Pindar’s Pythian Ode VIII, where Pindar refers to 
the human being as a “pathetic non-entity and ‘shady dream’” (Paragraph 3). Pindar’s 
Pythian Ode VIII concerns Aegina, an island close to the Piraeus, and its case for 
freeing itself from Athenian domination. This account in terms of the perspective of 
the Aeginetans has as its counter-point the perspective of the Athenians, who saw the 
island’s proximity to both their port and the Peloponnesus as a threat to their security 
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(Thucydides 2.27). That perspective is summed up in Pericles’ urging of the 
Athenians to remove “that eyesore of the Piraeus” (Plutarch, “Life of Pericles”, 
Chapter 8). Pericles was “extremely cautious in his use of words,” according to 
Plutarch, and left nothing behind in writing, except in the form of decrees he 
proposed. Only a few of these sayings, says Plutarch, have been handed down. 
Pericles’ saying with respect to Aegina is one of only two sayings quoted by Plutarch. 
Nietzsche’s reference to Pindar, then, leads the reader, in a circuitous manner to be 
sure, to Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles” – doing so, in the first instance, within the 
context of cautious communication. Not surprisingly, Plutarch’s reference to the 
undignified nature of artistic labour that we were searching occurs in his “Life of 
Pericles.”  
 
The reference occurs in Chapter 2, part of his two-chapter introduction to the second 
series of Lives. In that introduction, Plutarch asserts that this series of lives concerns 
models of virtue in action (praxesin). The implied distinction is to a virtue that is 
embodied in speech (logos) only. Pericles is to be the first example of someone who 
embodies virtue in action. Two issues with respect to Plutarch’s argument, however, 
strike the reader as contradicting that statement. First of all, early in his “Life of 
Pericles” Plutarch describes his background and influences. Three teachers are listed 
as having the most influence upon Pericles: Damon the musician, Zeno the Eleatic 
philosopher, and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. It is the latter who is described as the 
“one man more closely associated with Pericles than any other, who did most to 
clothe him with a majestic bearing that was more potent than any demagogue’s 
appeal, and who helped to develop the natural dignity of his character to the highest 
degree” (Chapter 4). For Nietzsche, when Pericles “stood before his people as public 
orator, in the beautiful rigidity and motionlessness of a marble Olympian and began to 
speak, calmly, wrapped in his mantle, its draperies unmoved, his countenance without 
change of expression, without smile, his strong voice powerfully even … then he 
represented the very image of the Anaxagorian cosmos, the image of nous itself that 
has built for itself a most beautiful and worthy mansion” (PTG 19; see also Phaedrus 
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269d-70b). Pericles’ three teachers, then, were a musician and two philosophers – 
teachers of virtue in speech, perhaps, but not of virtue in action. Secondly, the 
defining feature of Pericles’ “action” is that it consists of highly arranged and 
rhetorical speech. As noted above, our entry to the “Life of Pericles” was within the 
context of cautious communication – ensuring that the words are suited to the matter 
and audience at hand: “In this way he proved that rhetoric, in Plato’s phrase, is the art 
of working upon the souls of men by means of words, and that its chief business is the 
knowledge of men’s characters and passions which are, so to speak, the strings and 
stops of the soul and require a most skilful and delicate touch” (Chapter 15). If 
Pericles is Plutarch’s example of virtue in action, then this active virtue is certainly 
not that of an Achilles, for instance. It is a new virtue that consists of ruling through 
carefully constructed speech.  
 
This rhetorical power of speech to charm the many is associated, in Plato’s Republic, 
with the power of poetry to mould the characters and virtues of the members of the 
city. In the same way that poetry must stand before the philosopher’s scrutiny, so too 
must the art of the rhetorician. Both are criticized as dangerous unless put in the 
service of the wisest of men. Plato’s Republic does not ultimately banish poetry and 
rhetoric; rather, it institutes a new philosophically directed poetry and rhetoric (498c-
d; 595a-608b). Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles” concerns the Periclean art of philosophic 
rhetoric. Interestingly, in this context, it is the work that refers to Plato the most of all 
of Plutarch’s Lives.12 It is also the only one of the Lives wherein Plato is referred to as 
the divine (theios). The questions of Plato’s doctrine concerning art and of the relation 
of art to the state have led to Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles”, which concerns an example 
of a new type of “virtue in action” and wherein the “divine Plato” figures 
prominently. What can this strange coincidence tell us? We must return to Plutarch’s 
discussion of Pericles’ dominant mentor, Anaxagoras, for some preliminary answers 
to this question. 
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iii) Anaxagoras and the Good 
Anaxagoras brought philosophic inquiry from the Ionian colonies to Athens. 
According to Anaxagoras, all material elements of the cosmos have existed for all 
time – although in a chaotic mixture. It is pure Mind (Nous) that composed definite 
arrangements of like particles with like, such that things could have a definite shape 
and could be given a name (see Metaphysics 984b 15-18). Plutarch’s description of 
Anaxagoras emphasizes this as a turn in the history of philosophical inquiry: “he was 
the first to dethrone Chance and Necessity and set up pure Intelligence in their place 
as the principle of law and order which informs the universe, and which distinguishes 
from an otherwise chaotic mass those substances which possess elements in common” 
(Chapter 4).  
 
Plato’s Socrates was to take this one step further. In the Phaedo we are presented with 
Socrates’ philosophical autobiography – one presented in a more private setting, on 
his deathbed and among his closest friends, than his more famous accounting for his 
way of life in the Apology. In the latter dialogue, Socrates asserts that he takes no 
interest in the study of nature, or of the “things below the earth and in the sky” (19b-
c). This assertion seems to be contrasted by his private account of his inquiries, where 
Socrates intimates that earlier in his career he had undertaken inquiries into nature. 
These inquiries, he claims, led to a confrontation with the absurdity of its chaos. Even 
basic distinctions that he had taken for granted, such as that between a tall man and a 
short man, could be called into question and reversed if nature in its becoming is 
examined closely (Phaedo 96e – 97b). This examination of the things of nature in 
their pure becoming leads to a sort of blindness, Socrates claims, as when one tries to 
“watch and study an eclipse of the sun” (99d). This is the chaos of becoming that 
Nietzsche describes, where every “moment devours the preceding one, every birth is 
the death of countless beings, procreating, living and murdering are all one” (“GSt”, 
Paragraph 6).  
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Rather than resign himself, however, to accepting nature as absurd, as the modern 
physicist would have us do, Socrates found a way out of the this confusion by means 
of the thought of Anaxagoras. Upon first hearing Anaxagoras’ cosmological theories, 
Socrates was very pleased: “Somehow it seemed right that mind should be the cause 
of everything, and I reflected that if this is so, mind in producing order sets everything 
in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it” (97c). At first 
blush, Anaxagoras’ theories seemed to lead the way from the chaos of physical causes 
to a knowledge of the “final causes” of things. So, Socrates “lost no time in procuring 
the books, and began to read them as quickly as [he] possibly could, so that [he] might 
know as soon as possible about the best and the less good” (98b). To his surprise, 
however, Anaxagoras “made no use of mind and assigned to it no causality for the 
order of the world, but adduced causes like air and aether and water and many other 
absurdities” (98b-c). For this reason, Socrates took it upon himself to undertake a 
second voyage (deuteros ploūs) in search of causes (99c). Socrates’ second voyage 
constituted a turning from the study of things themselves in their becoming to a study 
of speeches (logoi). Socrates would use speeches as a way of “trying to discover the 
truth about things” (99d-e) – and the “truth about things” was now to be understood in 
the light of what is Good as such. As mentioned above, this search for wisdom 
concerning final causes was to become the defining feature of classical philosophy. 
 
For Nietzsche, this transformation of a purposeless Nous to one that arranges things in 
the best possible way represented a fateful turn in the history of philosophy – a turn 
from an aesthetic justification of the meaninglessness of existence to a moral one; also 
a turn that marked the end of the tragic age of the Greeks (PTG 19). Although the 
Phaedo presents Socrates as the one who effects that turn, for Nietzsche, it was Plato 
who was ultimately the author of this transformation, and Socrates merely as one of 
his characters: “Plato objects that [Anaxagoras] should have shown, but did not so, 
that each thing in its own fashion and its own place is most beautifully, best, and 
usefully situated” (emphasis added) (PTG 19). As we shall see, Nietzsche understands 
Plato’s motivations for undertaking this transformation in philosophical focus: Plato 
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needed to secure the fate of philosophy in the face of the city’s suspicions of its 
dangers. Philosophy had to make use of poetic fictions – of the Good as such or of the 
moral order of the cosmos – in order to provide for itself a home in the city. 
 
iv) Philosophy and the Polis 
Let us return to Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles” to understand Plato’s motivations more 
fully. In that work, Plutarch describes the confrontation of natural philosophy and 
ancestral myths and superstitions:  
 
In my opinion, however, there was nothing to prevent both the 
scientist and the prophet from being right, since the one correctly 
diagnosed the cause and the other the meaning of the prodigy. It 
was the business of the first to observe why something happens 
and how it becomes what it is, and of the second to foretell the 
purpose of an event and its significance. Those who say that to 
discover the cause of a phenomenon disposes of its meaning fail 
to notice that the same reasoning which explains away divine 
portents would also dispense with the artificial symbols created 
by mankind. The beating of gongs, the blaze of beacons, and the 
shadows on sundials all have their particular causes, but have 
also been contrived to signify something else (Chapter 6). 
 
 
Plutarch is pointing to the difference between the philosophical concern with beings 
in their becoming – their “coming to be” and their “origins” – and the mythical or 
poetic concern with the meaning of things beyond this becoming – as they are in the 
“end”. Interestingly, after the passage quoted above, Plutarch says: “However, this is 
perhaps a subject for a separate essay.” On the contrary, the passage is an elucidation 
of one of the central concerns of the “Life of Pericles”; it is also an indication of why 
Plato figures so prominently in that work, and is referred to as “divine”. 
 
The philosophical approach is dangerous, and treated suspiciously (PTG 1). Plutarch 
makes this explicit while discussing Nicias’ reaction to the eclipse of the moon, which 
ultimately led to the disastrous delay in the departure of the Athenian fleet from 
Sicily. Nicias’ superstitious response to this phenomenon provides an occasion for 
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Plutarch to discuss the reasons for the distrust of the philosophical account of the 
same phenomenon. “The first man to attempt to explain in writing the illumination 
and eclipse of the moon was Anaxagoras, and his account was the boldest and the 
most lucid of all. But this was a recent theory, nor did it enjoy much repute: in fact, it 
was still treated as a secret, confined to a small circle and only communicated with 
great caution rather than with confidence.” Philosophical discoveries need to be 
communicated cautiously to the many. The reason for this cautious communication is 
that these discoveries call into question the religious fictions that give meaning to the 
lives of the average citizen: “Public opinion was instinctively hostile towards natural 
philosophers and visionaries, as they were called, since it was generally believed that 
they belittled the power of the gods by explaining it away as nothing more that the 
operation of irrational causes and blind forces acting by necessity” (“Life of Nicias”, 
Chapter 23). Plutarch refers to the fact that many philosophers, as a result of this 
instinctive hostility on the part of the public, were persecuted: including Protagoras, 
Anaxagoras himself and ultimately Socrates. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates asserts that 
the charges brought against him at the trial were based on older, more dangerous 
charges, charges articulated by the poet Aristophanes (18a-19c). In his Clouds, 
Socrates is portrayed as one who “inquires into things below the earth and in the sky, 
and makes the weaker argument defeat the stronger, and teaches others to follow his 
example.” Of course, in the process, Socrates is portrayed as a ridiculously comic 
figure, one who “goes whirling round, proclaiming that he is walking on air” (Apology 
19b-c). Beneath this comic presentation, the poet’s ultimate critique of the Socratic 
philosopher is that he is unable to persuade the many; he is not able to assuage the 
instinctive hostility of the many, as represented by Strepsiades (Clouds 1490-1510). 
The poet, on the other hand, understands the passions of the many and can direct them 
accordingly (Republic 459e-60a; Laws 719b; Strauss 1989b, 179-83). 
 
Plato’s genius was to join philosophic inquiry with myth-giving poetry and the 
persuasive power of rhetoric. Through his invention of the “Good” as such, Plato 
ensured that his philosophy would be a discussion of the ends or meanings of things. 
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By making his inquiry into causes one and the same as the explication of ends, Plato 
was able to make philosophy appear less dangerous. Plato preserves philosophical 
inquiry by giving it a poetic and moral exterior. His Republic, in this sense, is the 
highest apology for philosophy that one could imagine – in response to the poetic 
accusations against philosophy presented by Aristophanes, Plato presents the finest 
poetic eulogy of philosophy. For Plutarch, this is the importance of Plato, and what 
made him “divine”. After referring to the atmosphere of persecution in which the 
earlier philosophers lived, Plutarch points out that it “was not until later that the 
glorious fame of Plato shone forth, and served, not only through the example of his 
life, but also through his teaching that the forces of nature are subject to a higher 
principle, to dispel the odium which had attached itself to such theories, thereby 
enabling them to circulate freely” (“Life of Nicias”, Chapter 23). 
 
v) Horace: On Philosophic Poetry 
The first reference in Nietzsche’s “The Greek State” is to Horace’s Ars Poetica. His 
first reference is not to a work dealing with political matters, but to one dealing with 
the craft or art of poetry. He points out that the modern “individual is flamboyantly 
pieced together like the fantastic creature at the beginning of Horace’s Ars Poetica” 
(Paragraph 2). In the text to which Nietzsche refers the reader, Horace compares a 
literary work lacking unity and consistency to the work of “a painter who wanted to 
combine a horse’s neck with a human head, and then clothe a miscellaneous 
collection of limbs with various kinds of feathers, so that what started out at the top as 
a beautiful woman ended in a hideously ugly fish” (124). Horace is building on a 
similar discussion of the need for speeches to have their own organic unity in Plato’s 
Phaedrus: “there is one point at least which I think you will admit, namely that any 
discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were; 
it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so 
composed as to suit each other and the whole work” (264c). Interestingly, the “city in 
speech” in the Republic is described in similar artistic terms (see 361d, 420c-d, 472d, 
488a). Ultimately, justice itself is defined along these broader lines of the unity and 
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consistency of all things, that is, as each element of the city performing its proper 
function within the context of the organic whole (433a).
13
 
 
The things themselves in their becoming can lack this unity or justice; they show 
themselves as the contradictory mixture of elements described by Socrates in the 
Phaedo. Turning to speeches (logoi), or accounts of things, allows things in their 
oneness to shine forth.
14
 This is why Socrates has his interlocutors help him to 
construct a “city in speech” in order to determine the essential limits of the political 
realm (369c). The artistically constructed speech or poetic fiction arranges the matter 
at hand into an appropriate, organic unity. Nietzsche’s refers to Horace in order to 
describe how modern individuals lack this type of artistically forged unity; they lack 
the type of fiction, or poetic word (logos), that would give their chaotic lives meaning. 
 
Horace’s work, to which we have been pointed by Nietzsche’s first reference, also 
refers to poetry, in its highest form, as being guided by “Socratic books”:  
 
 
Wisdom is the starting-point and source of correct writing. 
Socratic books will be able to point out to you your material, and 
once the material is provided the words will follow willingly 
enough. If a man has learned his duty to his country and his 
friends, the proper kind of love with which parent, brother, and 
guest should be cherished, the functions of a senator and a judge, 
the task of a general sent to the front – then he automatically 
understands how to give each character its proper attributes. 
(131) 
 
 
Horace calls for a type of poetry directed by the philosopher’s wisdom. This notion of 
a philosophic poetry is a product of the reversal effected by Plato in his contest with 
the poets. That is, prior to Plato’s contest with the poets, philosophy had been judged 
by the poet’s standards – which were essentially the standards of the city. Poets have 
always been the valets of a morality (GS 1) – enforcing the prejudices of a particular 
cave. In the Republic, Plato calls for a new, philosophic poetry. Such a poetry would 
provide the necessary lie – i.e., it would provide the fiction of an end or of a “Good” 
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as such – but would also spur the attentive reader to question these pre-given values. 
Such a poetry would spur the few who are able to free themselves and leave the cave. 
 
vi) Plato’s Contest with Homer 
We can see Plato’s editing and re-writing of Homer in the Republic in this light, that 
is, as the institution of a new, philosophic poetry. Socrates begins his criticism of the 
poets in Book 2 by saying that they do not tell the proper lies (377d). In particular, the 
lies that they tell about the gods need to be altered. For the poets, the gods are 
changeable, sometimes bringing good, sometimes bad. Plato’s Socrates presents a 
new order of gods, ones more amenable to human endeavour. This new order of 
philosophically-inspired gods are constant, truthful and good (377e-383c). At the 
centre of the dialogue we are confronted with the significance of this new order of 
gods. The old gods have been replaced by the philosophers’ ideas, and ultimately the 
idea of the Good as such. 
 
Next, in Book 3, Socrates addresses those poetic fictions that provide us with models 
of heroic virtues, most notably, the image of courage as presented in the figure of 
Achilles. Achilles’ brand of courage is presented as a specifically “political courage”, 
that is, the courage demanded of one who fights the enemy on the basis of a thumotic 
impulse, not on a rational basis (see 430c). The Homeric virtue of courage as 
presented in the figure of Achilles has limitations, which Socrates exposes. Plato 
presents the Socratic life as a new and higher example of the virtue of courage 
(Apology; Rabieh; Strauss 1983, 44). In order to re-write this conception of courage, 
Plato must edit and re-write the Homeric tradition of stories that support that 
conception (386b-393c). To take just one example, Plato has Socrates cite the 
following passage from Homer’s Odyssey as an example of a description of Hades 
that is inappropriate:  
 
I would rather be on the soil, a serf to another 
To a man without lot whose means of life are not great, 
Than rule over all the dead who have perished (XI.489-91). 
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At the beginning of Book 3, Socrates cites this passage as an example of the type of 
poetry that must be censured within the “city in speech” since it would provoke a fear 
of death as opposed to a willingness to battle fearlessly for the community (386c). 
Socrates opposes this passage because it does not teach the proper “political” virtues. 
However, later in the dialogue, the same passage reappears in a positive light. During 
his description of the image of the cave, Socrates describes the perspective of the 
freed prisoner upon recalling his previous life within the cave: “would he be affected 
as Homer says and want very much ‘to be on the soil, a serf to another man, to a 
portionless man,’ and to undergo anything whatsoever rather than to opine those 
things and live that way” (516d). Now Hades represents the cave of the political 
community and the speaker is saying that he would rather be the lowest thinker in the 
realm of truth than be the highest of rulers within that cave-like community. When 
discussing the philosophical nature and his virtues, the Homeric quote has been 
brought back in a new sense. Now, rather than as a spur to political, military action, 
the passage is used as a spur to philosophic reflection; it is an enticement to leave the 
cave of political opinion.  
 
Plato rewrites the tradition of Greek poetry and provides, in this way, a new 
philosophic poetry. Whereas the older poetry merely reflected the values of particular 
communities, Platonic poetry has the power to provoke the reader to question those 
values – this path of questioning is one reserved for the very few, however. It is 
reserved for those with the philosophic virtues, including philosophic courage, 
described in Books 6 and 7 of the Republic.  
 
vii) Plato’s Fiction of the Good 
Plato marries the philosophic inquiry into causes with the poetico-mythical concern 
with the why. He accomplishes this by means of the fiction of the “Good” in itself. In 
the Republic, Plato’s Socrates contrasts the many in their becoming to that which is 
one and is enduring. Each thing, says Socrates, has its Form or Idea. There are many 
glasses, for instance, but the Idea of glass allows one to see that which is enduring and 
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constant within the multiplicity of glasses that exist. Beyond the Ideas, there is the 
“Good”, which can be understood as the oneness and unity of the Ideas themselves. It 
is the Idea of the Ideas. As such, it is the ultimate object of knowledge for the 
philosopher.  
 
The Good can only be seen through its products or poetic images. Rather than the 
Good itself, Socrates is only able to present “what looks like a child of the good” 
(506e). The Good is the father of poetic offspring. This is a curious image and one has 
reason to suspect that the father in question is either absent or otherwise 
indeterminable. The reader approaches Socrates’ description of the Good only after 
encountering Socrates’ discussion of the family arrangements of his city in speech, 
wherein children would never know their fathers (457c-66d; Derrida 1981). The 
actual act of procreation undertaken by the Good, in this case the poetic creation of 
images, is also hidden; we only see the image in its final shining character. In 
reference to the shame of productive activity, upon observing the artistic product, 
upon hearing Socrates’ descriptions of the images of the sun, line and cave, we would 
not wish to be its maker; we would not wish to be Good as such. The Good withdraws 
and it is the images of the Good that spurs one to reflection on the nature of the Good. 
Plato’s Socrates says that it is in the light of the Good that things, out of the 
maelstrom of their becoming, can be discerned as this or that. Within the context of 
Nietzsche’s essay, we should more properly think of the Good as an artistic fiction or 
veil that gives shape to that which would otherwise be invisible. It gives form and 
distinction to otherwise chaotic phenomena.  
 
With this in mind, we could say that the Republic itself is an artistic veil that gives 
shape to political experience that would otherwise be shapeless, and thereby spurs one 
to reflection on political phenomena. This also means that the Republic is not to be 
viewed as a program for political action; that is, it is not a practical guide for the 
public administrator. Rather, it is a spur to individual questioning. Another way of 
considering this point is to highlight the fact that Plato’s Socrates, in describing the 
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philosophic journey by means of the image of the cave, does not describe a “mass 
enlightenment” or a bringing of knowledge and wisdom back to the cave; rather, he 
describes a mysterious selection and freeing of the few, or of the one, who are able to 
leave the realm of the political and its fictions (Bloom). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The crisis of modernity is an artistic crisis: it resides in the inability of modern culture 
to found itself aesthetically and to posit a meaning within the meaningless maelstrom 
of becoming. The tragic culture of the Greeks, on the other hand, was able to achieve 
this type of aesthetically grounded culture by means of a careful balancing of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian art impulses. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche asserts 
that Socratic optimism, with its limitless examination of the nature of things, led to 
the death of that tragic culture. This Socratic inquiry into things was optimistic in its 
assumption that the nature of things would reveal itself as in conformity with reason 
and moral order. Upon observing nature in its becoming, Socrates was not artistic 
enough to give existence a meaning.  
 
In “The Greek State,” Nietzsche turns to Plato as the one who was able to give such a 
meaning, as the original “artistic Socrates”. Nietzsche turns to the Republic and its 
treatment of the relation between art and the state in order to uncover Plato’s secret 
teaching – the teaching that has been occulted throughout the Western tradition of 
Socratism or Platonism. Plato’s secret teaching also offers Nietzsche insights into the 
path we must take in order to free ourselves from the crisis of modernity; that is, we 
must free philosophy and poetry from the tyranny of utilitarian science and allow a 
truly philosophic poetry to once again legislate values for humanity, that is, create a 
new fiction for humanity. 
 
Although “The Greek State” is, according to Nietzsche’s own declaration, an 
explication of the deepest secrets of Plato’s Republic, it does not seem, at first glance, 
to refer to that dialogue’s central concerns: the ultimate justification for the rule of the 
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philosopher, as discussed via the images of the sun, line and cave. As we have seen, 
however, upon closer inspection Nietzsche’s essay does reveal the essential 
connection between the philosopher’s legislation of values and the artist’s providing 
of meaningful fictions for the community. Plato’s new philosophic poetry combines 
these tasks.  
 
Whereas Plato had found a way to preserve the essential conditions of philosophic 
inquiry, in the modern age philosophy finds itself in a crisis condition; it is 
subservient to the scientific pursuit of the technologically useful (PTG 3). Seeing that 
the Pre-Socratic scientific enlightenment had dangerously asserted that existence is a 
chaotic play of forces, Plato provided the fiction of the Good as a way to shelter the 
many in the face of the meaninglessness of this existence. He provided the end or 
sheltering horizon that allowed the West to flourish for millennia, while still allowing 
for philosophic inquiry. The modern scientific enlightenment, and the mass education 
of its discoveries, has resulted in the calling into question of this Platonic fiction; it 
has found nature to be absurd, offering no standard for human endeavour or any 
framework for discerning what might be considered the “Good” as such. This attack 
on Plato’s fiction has resulted in the rule of the new religion of science over 
philosophy. The scientific attack against Platonism, however, has also created the 
tension of the bow that will allow humanity to shoot its arrow toward a new goal 
(BGE, “Preface”; Lampert 2001). In this context of the crisis conditions of 
philosophy, and the possibility that the tension of this bow may be dissipated, 
Nietzsche must be exoteric about philosophy’s esoteric nature. In order to prepare for 
the new creation of goals, Nietzsche must uncover the secret ways of Plato, as well as 
all other philosophers (“GSt” Paragraph 14; see also BGE 30). Nietzsche points out 
that Plato’s noble lie concerned making philosophy appear conventional. Plato’s 
invention of the fiction of the Good made philosophical inquiry appear beneficial and 
in accordance with the standards of the community: “philosophers too, as soon as, 
with priestly ulterior motives, they form the intention of taking in hand the direction 
of mankind, at once also arrogate to themselves the right to tell lies: Plato before all” 
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(WTP 141; see also, 140-43, 427-47; BGE 7, 40; and TI “The ‘Improvers’ of 
Mankind”). In other words, Plato put the philosopher in the mask of the priest (GM 
3.10). Or, to borrow the word of Plutarch, Plato made the philosopher “divine”.  
 
Nietzsche points to Plato’s esoteric nature in a brilliant fashion at the end of “The 
Greek State”. He points out how “Plato saw beyond the terribly mutilated Herm of 
contemporary state life, and still saw something divine inside it” (Paragraph 14). 
Nietzsche is referring to the speech by Alcibiades praising Socrates at the end of 
Plato’s Symposium. In that speech, Alcibiades asserts that Socrates’ speeches are like 
“sileni that open down the middle. Anyone listening to Socrates for the first time 
would find his arguments simply laughable … But if you open up his argument, and 
really get into the skin of them, you’ll find that they’re the only arguments in the 
world that have any sense at all, and that nobody else’s are so godlike” (221d-222a). 
A couple of points should be noted here. First of all, “The Greek State” is an 
explication of the essence of the political and of the Platonic dialogue that treats of 
that essence, the Republic. At the limits of the political there are the passions of the 
human soul, the passions (eros) which had to be directed and marginalized within the 
discussion of the city in speech in the Republic. The Symposium, on the other hand, is 
specifically directed toward this theme of eros that provides the essential limits of the 
political (Rosen 1968; Strauss 2001). The end of Nietzsche’s essay fittingly points us 
to that dialogue. Secondly, Nietzsche exposes the esoteric nature of the philosopher in 
his own name; he points to himself, “Mr. Nietzsche” (Strauss 1983, 174). It is only in 
the mouth of the drunken Alcibiades, on the other hand, that Plato allows this to be 
expressed (Rosen 1989, 163). 
 
We should not, however, allow this latter point to make us underestimate Nietzsche’s 
own rhetorical nature; Nietzsche is not entirely frank and forthcoming with respect to 
his insights. Although he exposes Plato’s fictions, Nietzsche must ultimately hide his 
own deepest teachings; he still needs to be esoteric in his own way. Nietzsche knows 
what lies behind any project of philosophic legislation: the groundlessness of all 
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goals, that even the newest creations will be no different than the “transparent lies” by 
which we currently live, other than being, hopefully, less transparent and more artistic 
(Rosen 1989, 161-2). However, Nietzsche only indicates this to the reader obliquely, 
by means of references to Plutarch and to Anaxagoras’ and Socrates’ confrontations 
with the indefinable becoming that is existence. This truth, the groundlessness of all 
projects, including Nietzsche’s own, is what Nietzsche had to express cautiously, 
through a “grand hieroglyph” of references and allusions. In this essay, “we have said 
what we believe we have fathomed of this secret script.” 
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Textual Note and Abbreviations 
 
Textual note:  
For “The Greek State” and “Homer on Competition,” I have used the translation by 
Carol Diethe (in Nietzsche 1994, pages 176-86 and 187-94 respectively). The German 
text of the two essays can be found in volume I of Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke: 
Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1988), p 764-78 and 783-93. Because 
of the short length of the essays, and to facilitate cross-reference with the original and 
with other translations, I have referred to these essays by paragraph number. For 
Nietzsche’s other works, I have used the appropriate section numbering as a reference 
– except in the case of Nietzsche’s early unpublished notes (Nb), which I have 
referred to by notebook and page number. 
 
 
Abbreviations: 
Dates in parentheses refer to year of publication or composition. 
 
A = The Antichrist (1888), in Nietzsche 1954, 568-656 
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil (1886), in Nietzsche 1966, 179-435  
BT = The Birth of Tragedy (1872), in Nietzsche 1966, 3-144  
CW = The Case of Wagner (1888), in Nietzsche 1966, 609-48 
D = Daybreak (1881), Nietzsche 1982 
EH = Ecce Homo (1888), in Nietzsche 1966, 671-791 
GM = On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Nietzsche 1994 
GS = The Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche (1974) 
“GSt” = “The Greek State” (1871) 
“GW” = “The Greek Woman” (1871), in Nietzsche 1964, 21-6 
“HC” = “Homer on Competition” (1872) 
HH = Human, All too Human (1878), Nietzsche 1986 
Nb = Unpublished Writings (1872-74), Nietzsche 1995  
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PP = The Pre-Platonic Philosophers (Course given 1872, 1873 and 1876), Nietzsche 
2001 
PTG = Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873), Nietzsche 1962  
TI = Twilight of the Idols (1888), in Nietzsche 1954, 463-563  
TZ = Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-5), in Nietzsche 1954, 103-439 
UMa = David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer (1873), in Nietzsche 1983, 3-55 
UMb = Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (1874), in Nietzsche 1983, 59-123 
UMc = Schopenhauer as Educator (1874), in Nietzsche 1983, 127-94 
WTP = The Will to Power (1883-88), Nietzsche 1967 
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NOTES 
 
 
1
  Interpretations of Nietzsche’s political thinking abound; see Hunt, Ansell-Pearson 1991 and 1994a, 
Strong, and Warren. These interpretations are commendable in many respects. One aspect that is 
commendable in these works is that they call for a more nuanced interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
political thought than has traditionally been offered. That is, they call for an interpretation that does 
not label his thinking with the names of any of the modern political ideologies that dominate 
contemporary political thinking. For instance, Hunt makes the case that Nietzsche cannot rightly be 
called, on the one hand, a totalitarian or an authoritarian, or an anarchist on the other (25-6). 
Similarly, Ansell-Pearson calls into question Nietzsche’s link to modern liberalism (1994a). Despite 
the existence of these fine studies, there is still room for more scholarly exploration of Nietzsche’s 
political philosophy. There has been, for example, no systematic interpretation of Nietzsche’s early 
works with the goal of discerning his early political thinking. In that respect, this essay, along with 
its predecessor, are offered as a small contribution to such a systematic interpretation. 
 
2
  As Keith Ansell-Pearson points out, this quote is often “taken at face value rather than understood 
in its specific context where Nietzsche expresses his opposition to German nationalism and statism 
under the rule of Bismarck” (1994b, ix). 
 
3
  In the French tradition, this anti-political dimension of Nietzsche’s thinking has been approached in 
a different way. Rather than a philosophy promoting the self-realization of a particular individual or 
subject-identity, for poststructuralists, following Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche’s thinking is seen as a 
revolution against even the “micropolitical” fascism of fixed, subject identities. See Deleuze 1977, 
1983, 1990; Deleuze and Guattari 1983; Derrida 1979 and “Différance” in 1982, 1-27; Klossowski; 
and Lyotard. Of course, it is Foucault who, perhaps, sums up this poststructural view most 
succinctly: “Rather than the death of God – or, rather, in the wake of that death and in a profound 
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correlation with it – what Nietzsche’s thought heralds is the end of his murderer; it is the explosion 
of man’s face in laughter and the return of masks” (1973, 385); see also Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” in 1977, 139-64. 
 
4
  According to the standard approach, Nietzsche’s works have been divided into early, middle and 
late periods. These divisions are marked by literary, intellectual as well as personal developments 
and find support in Nietzsche’s own account of his literary career in Ecce Homo. The early period 
(1870-76) corresponds to Nietzsche’s years as a professor of classics at Basel University and is 
marked by his close association with Richard Wagner. In this period, Nietzsche turns to the Greeks 
for clues as to how modern German culture can be revived on aesthetic grounds.  
The middle period (1876-82) corresponds to his break with Wagner and his abandonment of his 
vision of a classically inspired, aesthetic renewal of German culture. Rather than a specifically 
German culture, Nietzsche adopts the cosmopolitan perspective of the “good European”, and rather 
than seeking redemption through the fictions of art, Nietzsche seeks it through knowledge. That is, 
while in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) art is necessary to protect us from the horrors of reality, in 
Human, All too Human (1878) Nietzsche asserts that this sort of artistic deception is life denying 
rather than enhancing.  
Finally, the late period (1883-88) begins with the publication of the first part of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. It is often referred to as Nietzsche’s “mature” phase – the phase in which he outlines 
his “final position” and develops the doctrines that are associated with his name: the overman, will 
to power, and eternal return. For a discussion of how Nietzsche’s early period has often been 
overlooked in favour of this “mature” period, see Quentin P. Young 1-3. 
 
5
  Laurence Lampert has done an expert job of uncovering the complex relations with the thought of 
Plato that are on display in Nietzsche’s two major works: Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond 
Good and Evil; see 1986, 2001 and 2004. For a counter-argument to this emphasis on the role of 
Plato in Nietzsche’s thought, see Brobjer.  
 
6
  I have slightly altered the Diethe translation here: substituting “esoteric doctrine” (Mügge’s 
translation [Nietzsche 1964]) for “secret study” (Diethe’s translation). 
 
7
  For a good discussion of “renaissance self-fashioning”, see Greenblatt. 
 
8
  For other articulations of the position that the goal of Baconian science is a total mastery or power 
over nature, see Paterson; Hulse 318, 322; Faulkner 4, 7; Whitney 1; Weinberger 9; and Van 
Leeuwen 2. 
 
9
  On this point, the Christian experience of truth as related to the securing of salvation, see Heidegger 
1973, 19-26; 1982, 87-89; 1977a, 89-90, 122; and 1992, 51. 
 
10
  On this self-grounding of knowledge and truth, see, also, Heidegger 1977b, 272. 
 
11
  Nietzsche’s relations to the “problem of Socrates” are complex. For an overview of the issues at 
stake, see Blondel, Dannhauser, Kofman, and Tejera. 
 
12
  Plato is referred to or quoted 5 times in Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles” – including a quotation that 
Plutarch mistakenly attributes to Aristotle. This ties the “Life of Pericles” with the “Life of Solon” 
for the largest number of references to Plato. 
 
13
  On this point, Heidegger is instructive: “Dikē is translated as “justice,” but that misses the proper 
sense, inasmuch as justice is transposed straightaway into the moral or even the merely “legal” 
realm. But dikē is a metaphysical concept, not originally one of morality. It names Being with 
reference to the essentially appropriate articulation of all beings” (1979, 165-66). 
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14
  Logos originally comes from legein, which means “to speak”, but also “to gather” such that what is 
gathered is brought together into an articulated unity (Heidegger 1959, 127-8; 1976, 252; Sallis 7). 
In this sense we could say that the Greek definition, rather than pointing to the human as the 
rational or logical animal, defines the human as the animal able to gather the disparate phenomena 
of existence into a meaningful unity or whole and to articulate the meaning of that unity – in short, 
the animal able to make accounts. 
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